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Abstract:  
The author aims to investigate the current status of legal protection of whistle-blowers. She will 
focus on the treatment of the ex-Head of Regulatory Risk at HBOS prior to the financial crisis of 
2007. The author then reviews the whistle-blowing policies and Codes of Conduct of five UK banks 
and compares them with the policies in the health industry.  
The paper first utilises the black letter law approach to review the current status of legal protection 
to whistle-blowers. The author then undertakes empirical research into the whistle-blowing policies 
and Codes of Conduct of five major UK banks. She also adopts a comparative socio-legal analysis, 
studying the law in both the US and UK. 
Whistle-blowers play an important role in increasing transparency and informing regulators to stay 
ahead of malpractice. Legislation alone cannot protect whistle-blowers fully. Corporate governance 
measures and a tripartite gatekeeping model between the regulator, Chief Risk Officer and auditors 
are required to give whistle-blowers more protection. 
This paper will have policy implications for practitioners and policy makers on national and 
international dimensions. Whistle-blowing in the financial industry has been neglected in the major 
corporate governance and banking regulation reports. The author combines empirical research with 
her own model of tripartite gatekeeping to protect whistle-blowers in the financial world. This paper 
is thus original and valuable to both academics and practitioners.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Financial stability is vital to both developed and developing countries. The financial crisis of 2007-
2009 has revealed both regulatory and corporate governance problems within financial institutions 
in the United Kingdom. The Walker (Walker, 2009) and Turner (Turner, 2009) Reviews of 2009 
concluded that excessive leverage, inadequate liquidity and reckless risk-taking contributed to the 
financial crisis. The Independent Commission on Banking’s report of 2011 (Vickers, 2011b) 
recommended retail ring-fencing to reduce systemic risks. Whilst governments at the national, 
European and international levels are working towards better regulation and corporate governance, 
one important area has been neglected—the protection of whistle-blowers, especially in the 
financial industry. The financial industry is notoriously opaque due to complex financial products and 
services (Acharya et al., 2009, Claessens et al., 2010). To increase transparency and accountability, 
protection to whistle-blowers must be enhanced. The corporate governance paradigm has shifted 
from the traditional reliance on shareholders and boards of directors to ‘gatekeepers’ in analysing 
control of companies (Rapp, 2010). Recently, scholars have realised the important role played by 
whistle-blowers in corporate governance. Rapp et al (Rapp, 2010) state that whistle-blowers have 
earlier and better information about the most heinous type of corporate fraud since whistle-blowers 
are usually insiders. Fisher et al (Fisher et al., 2000) opine that whistle-blowing is a useful deterrent 
and encourages whistle-blowing in the financial industry. Now is the time to address this area. 
This paper will first examine the legislation on whistle-blowing and its problems in the UK. The Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA) protects, but does not encourage whistle-blowing. The PIDA does 
not require employers to put in place organisational whistle blowing policies. According to the 2009 
report by Public Concern at Work (an independent authority on whistle-blowing), only 38% of 
employers have a whistle-blowing policy in place. The author will focus on whistle-blowing in the 
financial industry. This is illustrated by a study into the whistle-blowing policies of the five banks in 
the UK and an interview with Paul Moore. The author has interviewed Paul Moore, the ex-Head of 
Group Regulatory Risk at HBOS, who has been labelled as a whistle-blower. His revelations are very 
important towards reforming the financial landscape. The author will then compare the whistle-
blowing policies in the financial industry with those of the health industry. Several recent high profile 
NHS whistle-blowers received detrimental treatment and it is worth examining these two industries 
in detail. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 sets out the protection given to whistle-
blowers in the UK. Section 3 explains the methodology used in this paper. Section 4 deals with 
whistle-blowers in the UK financial industry. Section 5 is a critical analysis of the whistle-blowing 
policy of the five major UK banks. This will be compared with the whistle-blowing policies of NHS 
Foundation Trusts. Section 6 sets out the author’s model given to risk managers in the financial 
industry. Finally, section 7 concludes.  
Section 2: UK Law on whistle-blowing 
Current UK law provides inadequate protection to whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowers who disclose 
non-confidential information are seen to be breaching the common law implied duty of good faith 
and fidelity. (Lewis, 2001) Traditionally, employees act as agents of their principals, their employers. 
If they complain about their corporation either internally or externally, they are perceived as disloyal 
and deviant. (Larmer, 1992) Larmer stated that this is a very narrow approach to employment law 
and governance. At the other end of the spectrum, Duska argued that employees do not owe a 
prima facie duty of loyalty to their employers. Therefore, whistle-blowing does not have to be 
justified on moral grounds. (Duska, 1985) The author believes that Duska’s submission is too 
extreme. Employees have to consider their employers’ interests although they are not under a duty 
to act in the latter’s interests under the common law implied duty of good faith and fidelity. The 
common law implied duty applies to all employees. Hierarchy within an organisation does not 
influence the common law duty. On the other hand, the equitable principle of fiduciary duties 
applies only to senior employees and professionals who act on behalf of their clients. Fiduciaries 
must act in the best interests of their clients, in good faith and must not make a profit. Loyalty is 
thus required from the fiduciaries. Although the equitable principle and the common law duty have 
merged in some ways, as seen in the case of Neary v Dean of Westminster (1999) opine that the two 
are different. The equitable principle is one-sided since the fiduciary owes an absolute duty to 
his/her employer or client. With the common law duty, the employee has to take into account of the 
employer’s interests but does not owe a duty to act in the latter’s interests. Therefore, the equitable 
principle of fiduciary duties imposes a higher burden on employees. It will be seen in section 3 that 
Moore, the ex- Head of Group Regulatory Risk at HBOS, owes an equitable principle to their 
employers but his disclosure of HBOS’s excessive risk strategy and breach of FSA rules were not 
welcomed by his employers. Moore also alleged that several directors of HBOS breached their 
fiduciary duties when he blew the whistle. The equitable principle failed to protect Moore.  
In theory, the scope of the common law implied duty of good faith and fidelity is wide. Hepple 
believes that this duty imposes a duty to respect the employee's human rights. (Hepple, 1998) 
Employees should feel free to express any concerns about illegal, immoral or wrongful practice. In 
the case of Heinisch v Germany, (2011) the European Court of Human Rights have found that where 
a whistle-blower is dismissed, this could amount to a breach of the right to freedom of expression 
under Art 10 European Convention of Human Rights unless it was “prescribed by law, pursues a 
legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society for achievement of such an aim” and in 
particular, whether the interference was a proportionate response to the aim pursued. Here, it was 
held that Mrs Heinrich disclosed information of public interest; she acted in good faith; she had not 
knowingly reported false information and that she tried disclosing internally but management did 
not indicate when a solution will be available. This protects whistle-blowers' freedom of expression 
but does little to protect their employment status. 
In relation to disclosing confidential information, employees can use the ‘public interest’ defence. 
This defence is however weak in practice, as demonstrated in cases such as Initial Services v Putterill 
(1968), Lion Laboratories v Evans (1985) and Re a Company’s Application (1989). These cases 
demonstrated that the ‘public interest’ defence has been construed narrowly by the Courts. Only 
disclosure to a regulatory body in Re a Company’s Application enabled an employee to whistle blow 
in the public interest. Employees of the National Health Service (NHS) face a difficult choice of 
whether their duty to maintain patient confidentiality should prevail over their wider professional 
obligations under their employment contracts and codes of conduct. The Courts have not set out 
clear guidelines as to whether professional obligations will prevail over their contractual duties. 
(Cripps, 1995) 
Under section 43 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA), employees appear to be better 
protected than under case law. The preamble states that the PIDA is ‘An Act to protect individuals 
who make certain disclosures of information in the public interest; to allow such individuals to bring 
action in respect of victimisation; and for connected purposes.’  Employees are protected if they 
inform on their employer where there is an issue of legitimate public concern. As long as the 
employees make a ‘qualifying disclosure’ under section 43B(1) PIDA in good faith (section 43D) and 
satisfy the conditions in section 43G, they should be protected.  For the purpose of section 43B(1)(b) 
of PIDA, it was held in Babula v Waltham Forest College (2007) that the whistle-blower’s reasonable 
belief is significant, not whether or not the belief turned out to be wrong. The use of the word 
"likely" did not mean that the whistle-blower had to be correct. Although the PIDA provides a 
framework where internal disclosures within the organisation are protected, wider disclosures to 
external parties are more difficult. The principle of ‘protected disclosure’ is more difficult to fulfil. In 
Goode v Marks and Spencer Plc. (2009), the employee’s communication to The Times did not qualify 
as ‘protected disclosure’ since his external disclosure was dissimilar to the internal one. However, 
the PIDA will protect employees in exceptionally serious circumstances who disclose confidential 
information externally to the media. (2005) The case of Holbrook v Queen Mary Sidcup NHS Trust 
(2006) suggests that the whistle-blower should raise his/her concerns internally first before 
contacting the media.  
Unlimited compensation for unfair dismissal of a whistle-blower under section 8 of the PIDA should 
act as a deterrent for employers. Unfortunately, dismissals do take place. Peter Hamilton, the 
barrister who acted for Paul Moore, explained that: ‘I don’t suppose any legislation could prevent an 
employer firing someone, subject to the right to compensation, but once you’ve lost your job 
because you’ve been a whistle-blower it’s very difficult to be reemployed and I’m not sure there’s a 
realistic answer to that problem.’ (Laver, 2011) The employer is often in a stronger position due to 
resources and power. Once employees are dismissed for whistle-blowing, it is very difficult for them 
to find new jobs. They are often seen as outcasts. Therefore, changes must be made to the law and 
governance to protect whistle-blowers better. After all, an empirical study by Jos et al. (Jos et al., 
1989) reports that when asked “if you knew the results of your whistle-blowing before you 
attempted to report these incidents, would you have done what you did?” an overwhelming 
majority (81%) of fired whistle-blowers have answered affirmatively. When such a high percentage 
of whistle-blowers are prepared to act selflessly, it is only just and fair that greater protection is 
given to them. Before the author discusses her proposals in protecting whistle-blowers, she will 
discuss her methodology used in the next section.  
Section 3: Methodology 
This paper covers employment law and corporate governance. The author believes that sole reliance 
on black letter law to protect whistle-blowers in the financial industry is inadequate. As seen in the 
previous section, there are weaknesses in both case law and legislation in protecting whistle-
blowers. PIDA has been criticised for not protecting independent contractors and volunteers. It does 
not protect expatriate workers of UK companies based abroad unless they have strong ties with 
British employment law.(Lowe, 2012) It does little to encourage whistleblowing and does not 
provide financial incentives. It does not include vicarious liability which means that employers will 
not be liable when a whistle-blower is subjected to bullying or harassment for making a qualified 
disclosure.(James, 2012) Under PIDA, lawyers are not protected from whistleblowing if they breach 
legal professional privilege. Looking ahead, the new Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill in the UK 
does little to improve the protection given to whistle-blowers. Under section 15 of this Bill, a whistle-
blower will only be protected for qualifying disclosures which are in the ‘public interest’. This is 
judged by both subjective and objective standards since the Employment Tribunal will examine the 
qualifying disclosure from the worker’s reasonable belief. Cathy James, Chief Executive of Public 
Concern at Work, said that the new Bill will ‘result in a field day for lawyers and that this is a missed 
opportunity for addressing problems which have arisen in the legal protection for whistle-
blowers’.(James, 2012) She added that: ‘if the public interest test is to be inserted into the legislation 
as proposed, then it should replace the good faith test in the legislation as a countervailing measure 
to ensure that the legislation continues to strike the right balance between the public interest, the 
interests of workers raising concerns and the interests of employers.’ (James, 2012) The Bill is 
currently in the final stages of the House of Lords, so further amendments may be made. In light of 
these issues, the author adopts a comparative socio-legal approach to this paper, incorporating the 
dynamic changes of recent events and the law into her paper. The financial crisis of 2007 is a recent 
phenomenon and had a severe impact on the markets in both the US and UK. A comparative analysis 
is undertaken to compare and contrast the law on whistle-blowing. She will then extend the 
‘gatekeeper’ theory in corporate governance to whistle-blowers in the financial industry with the 
aim of improving accountability in financial institutions. 
Section 4: Whistle-blowers in the UK finance sector 
Fisher et al (Fisher et al., 2000) opine that whistle-blowing is a useful deterrent and encourages 
whistle-blowing in the financial industry. They submit that whistle-blowers help regulate the 
financial sector, since revealing wrongdoings will have a disinfectant effect and encourage 
adherence to regulation. Paul Moore, ex-Head of Group Regulatory Risk at HBOS between 2002-
2004, knew as early as 2003/4 that ‘the bank was going too fast (and told them), had a cultural 
indisposition to challenge (and told them) and was a serious risk to financial stability and consumer 
protection (and told them).’ (Moore, 2009a) He added that HBOS did not minute the fact that he 
warned them of their speed of expansion. Moore was made redundant by Sir James Crosby, the then 
CEO of HBOS. Moore brought a claim for unfair dismissal under the whistle-blowing provisions of the 
PIDA. Moore received a ‘fair compensation’ from HBOS (Moore, 2009a). He was subject to a gagging 
order by HBOS but he believed that public interest prevailed, so he breached the gagging order 
when he gave evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee under the protection of 
parliamentary privilege.  
Moore said that he was not trying to find a scapegoat when he decided to give evidence at the 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (Moore, 2009a). He was interested in looking 
forward, in learning from past failures. Moore’s evidence was very revealing. It shows that HBOS had 
little regard for risk management. After Moore was made redundant, he was replaced by a sales 
manager who had never been a risk manager before. The CEO personally made that appointment 
and against the wishes of the other directors. Moore questioned whether the CEO has breached his 
fiduciary duties as a result of this personal appointment. Secondly, the FSA raised red flags in 2004 
that key sectors of the HBOS group posed “medium or high” risks to maintaining market confidence 
and protecting customers. Thirdly, risk management conflicted with other areas of the business. Risk 
management’s concerns were not recorded in board minutes. Moore was strongly reprimanded for 
‘tabling at a Group Audit Committee meeting the full version of a critical report by my department 
making it clear that the systems and controls, risk management and compliance were inadequate in 
the Halifax to control its “over-eager” sales culture’(Moore, 2009a). Fourthly, corporate governance 
practice was poor at HBOS. There was little encouragement for challenging board decisions. One of 
the non-executive directors at HBOS admitted to Moore that he had no idea what the role of the 
Chairman of the Retail Risk Control Committee entails. Despite being an excellent businessman, this 
non-executive director was a close friend of Andy Hornby, the CEO who replaced Sir James Crosby. 
This personal relationship forged a boardroom culture of rubber-stamping rather than scrutiny. 
Finally, there was a fear culture in HBOS where ‘…there were many more people in internal control 
functions, non-executive positions, auditors, regulators who did realise that the Emperor was naked 
but knew if they spoke up they would be labelled “trouble makers” and “spoil sports” and would put 
themselves at personal risk.’(Moore, 2009b) The irony is that Moore was the ex-Head of Group 
Regulatory Risk. It was part of his job to oversee the systems and controls, risk compliance and 
management of HBOS. It was his duty to warn the board of HBOS if the bank was taking excessive 
risk or lending too aggressively. When he did warn them, he was ignored, reprimanded and 
ultimately dismissed. The common law implied duty of good faith and fidelity; equitable principle of 
fiduciary duties; PIDA and corporate governance all failed to give Moore adequate protection.  
In Moore’s opinion, ‘further development of whistle-blowing rules to make sure that those who raise 
legitimate issues are not just “bought off” with shareholders’ money....the case should be reviewed 
by the regulator and action taken if necessary to ensure those responsible cannot get away scot-
free’ (Moore, 2009a) is required to improve protection for whistle-blowers. Two points need to be 
addressed. First, whistle-blowers should be able to raise legitimate concerns with the assurance that 
they will be seriously addressed. Whistle-blowers are employees, insiders and stakeholders of the 
organisation concerned. They often have vested interests for the organisation to do well. 
Understandably, there are sometimes issues raised by whistle-blowers which are of a trivial nature 
or that the information is unreliable (Fisher et al., 2000). Nevertheless, risk managers in banks such 
as Moore have a duty to raise concerns regarding risk management and internal controls. He is only 
fulfilling his job, legal and equitable duties to bring the attention of such matters to senior 
management. Organisations should implement whistle-blowing policies at work and include a clause 
in employment contracts that the policy will be implemented when employees raise legitimate 
concerns. If the employer fails to follow the whistle-blowing policy, it will be a breach of contract. 
Employees will thus be able to bring a wrongful dismissal claim in addition to unfair dismissal. The 
ACAS Code on disciplinary and grievance procedures is considered as best practice to adopt. 
Although it is not statutory authority, failure to follow the Code may result in an uplift of up to 25% 
when the Court or tribunal awards compensation to the employee. It is proposed that there should 
be an ACAS Code on whistle-blowing and the uplift of 25% should be followed to protect whistle-
blowers. This would also assure whistle-blowers that their issues are taken seriously. 
More should be done in corporate governance to protect whistle-blowers who are risk managers. 
Directors who have been reckless in their risk strategy should be held responsible when the 
organisation suffers losses, which are then passed onto taxpayers in the case of banks. 
Accountability must be seen to be done. So far in the financial crisis of 2007, only three directors 
have been held accountable. David Baker (former chief executive) and Richard Baclay (former 
managing credit director) of Northern Rock were fined and banned by the FSA for hiding debt.  David 
was fined £504,000 and is banned from taking new roles at regulated financial institutions. Richard is 
fined £140,000 and cannot hold any senior roles at Northern Rock again. Peter Cummings, former 
director at HBOS, has been fined £500,000 and banned from working in the city for life. This is the 
most severe penalty imposed on bank executives for their actions in the financial crisis. Tracey 
McDermott, Director of enforcement and financial crime at the FSA, said that: “Despite being aware 
of the weaknesses in his division and growing problems in the economy, Cummings presided over a 
culture of aggressive growth without the controls in place to manage the risks associated with that 
strategy. Instead of reacting to the worsening environment, he raised his targets as other banks 
pulled out of the same markets."(Russell, 2012 )  
Moore’s second suggestion is that the FSA should have more resources so that they can recruit the 
best people. The FSA’s ARROW visit in 2003 identified the key risks. Moore believed that ‘the 
operational staff at the FSA had done a good job on the ARROW visit they had conducted and that 
they almost certainly had identified the key risks at the bank at that stage in its development’. 
(Moore, 2010) Moore’s submission is that the senior staff failed to act upon the red flags. Peter 
Hamilton, barrister acting for Moore, recommended that whistle-blowers should have the right to 
raise concerns with the FSA before raising them internally. He also states that the parliamentary 
ombudsman should have power and jurisdiction to deal with whistle-blowers’ concerns and appeals. 
(Laver, 2011) It is important that risk managers in banks are able to work closely with FSA staff, so 
that any problems can be dealt with openly, honestly and efficiently. The author will compare the 
position of whistle-blowers in the UK financial and health industries before making 
recommendations. 
Section 5: Whistle-blowing policies in the financial industry and health industry 
As part of this paper, the author did empirical research and reviewed the whistle-blowing policies of 
five UK banks between 2004-2011: Northern Rock; The Royal Bank of Scotland; Lloyds Banking 
Group; Barclays and HSBC. Northern Rock was included in the study because it was the first bank in 
the UK to experience financial difficulties during the financial crisis of 2007. The author has also 
studied the whistle-blowing policy of the regulator, the Financial Services Authority. Whistle-blowing 
is protected by statutes, namely the Public Interest Disclosure Act. Under the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, companies listed in the UK are obliged to have whistle blowing arrangements or 
explain why they do not. Corporate governance plays an important role when it comes to regulate 
human behaviour. Therefore, Codes of Conduct and internal whistle-blowing policies should provide 
detailed information to protect employees who may want to blow the whistle. These Codes and 
policies should also be incorporated into the employee’s contract to protect employees. 
It is unfortunate that the five UK banks do not have comprehensive whistle-blowing policies. The 
Royal Bank of Scotland has the most comprehensive whistle-blowing policy. This is found in the RBS 
Code of Conduct 2011: 
‘We want to know about any internal behaviour or questionable business practices you feel 
may be unethical without fear of victimisation, discrimination, dismissal or detriment. 
Concerns can be raised by using the Group’s Whistle-blowing service, Right Call - an 
independent, free, confidential telephone helpline and web service. Right Call aims to 
reduce the Group’s risk, potential losses, and possible reputational damage by providing an 
impartial service. Both phone calls and web reports are managed confidentially by an 
independent specialist offering a range of language options. 
A unique reference number is provided after each call. Those who raise concerns can review 
their report on the Right Call website by using their reference code and respond to any 
additional questions relating to their concern. For further information refer to the Group 
Policy Framework Whistle-blowing Policy Standard. If Right Call is not available, refer to your 
Divisional/Local Regulatory Risk team for details of how to raise any concerns.’(The Royal 
Bank of Scotland Plc, 2011) 
It is encouraging to see that employees are reassured that they will not be victimised, ostracised, 
discriminated or dismissed if they blow the whistle. Right Call is an independent service, which 
should reduce the employee’s fear of discussing the matter internally. RBS have certainly made 
improvements in protecting whistle-blowers. They did not have a whistle-blowing policy between 
2004-2010. It would be helpful however, for employees to have access to the Group Policy 
Framework Whistle-blowing Policy Standard mentioned in the Code of Conduct.  
Northern Rock has a generic and broad statement about their whistle-blowing policy in 2011: ‘As 
part of its remit, it [the Audit Committee] oversaw anti-money laundering and whistle-blowing 
procedures’.(Northern Rock Plc, 2011) On its website, the duties of the Audit Committee include 
‘reviewing the procedures operated by the compliance function for handling allegations from 
whistle-blowers and, upon request, review a log of all complaints’. There is a paragraph in Northern 
Rock’s 2004 Annual Report stating that ‘the company reviewed its obligations under public interest 
disclosure, strengthening the policy to protect staff in the event of whistle-blowing’.(Northern Rock 
Plc, 2004) Northern Rock do not have a Code of Conduct and there is nothing on whistle-blowing 
between 2005-2007. It is only in 2009 that the bank started to include general statements about 
their whistle-blowing procedure. 
In Lloyds TSB’s annual report of 2007, Lloyds mentioned that they have ‘a whistle-blowing policy 
setting out the procedure by which people can raise, in any confidence, any matters of concern. A 
whistle-blowing line enables employees to raise any concerns and for such matters to be 
independently investigated’.(Lloyds Banking Group, 2007) There was nothing on whistle-blowing 
between 2008-2009. In 2010 and 2011, the Lloyds stated in their annual report that they had 
reviewed the group’s whistle-blowing procedures and incidents. Lloyds have a Code of Conduct but 
whistle-blowing is not mentioned. HBOS do not have any information on whistle-blowing in their 
annual reports 2004-2011. They do not have a Code of Conduct. Barclays and HSBC are similar in 
that they do not have information on whistle-blowing in their annual reports 2004-2011. They have 
a Code of Conduct/Ethics respectively but whistle-blowing is not mentioned. These three banks are 
not transparent or helpful to employees who wish to raise a concern. Particularly worrying is Lloyds 
Banking Group in light of Paul Moore’s experience. It would be helpful if the bank can provide a 
more thorough policy on whistle-blowing. Barclays have announced in mid-September 2012 that 
they are keen to see a professional body for bankers who will strike off rogue bankers at all 
levels.(Knight, 2012) This professional body with be part of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) will be replaced by the FCA and the Prudential Regulation 
Authority in 2013. The current proposal states that the professional body would be independent but 
funded by the major banks. The creation of a professional body and Code of Conduct will make 
bankers more aware if their duties. The increased enforcement role of the FCA will hopefully act as a 
deterrent to rogue traders. However, the FCA must practise what they preach and take enforcement 
action where necessary. One of the weaknesses of the FSA is that it rarely fined or banned senior 
executives. The author also believes that there will be not be a level playing field when only the 
major banks fund the professional body. There is a danger that the smaller banks and building 
societies will not be treated on parity as they do not fund the professional body. The author 
proposes that each banker will need to hold a valid practising certificate, to be renewed every year 
with a fee. This fee will contribute towards funding the FCA. The annual renewal will also be an 
annual check on bankers’ ability to carry on practising.  Currently, the FSA encourage bank 
employees to discuss issues internally first then use the FSA Whistle-blowing Helpline if they wish. As 
a prescribed person under the Public Interest Disclosure Act, the FSA is an alternative source for 
employees. Employees working in the financial sector should feel safe to report any concerns 
internally and externally. This is particularly so given that banks have a wide stakeholder interests, 
especially after the government bail-out of Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Northern Rock. Financial 
institutions have only started to include whistle-blowing policies recently. As seen above, the policies 
tend to be brief and generic, with the exception of RBS.   
In comparison, NHS Foundation Trust whistle-blowing policies tend to be more draconian and 
punitive in style. The Government expects public bodies to have a policy in place and the whistle 
blowing schemes in local authorities and NHS bodies in England are assessed regularly as part of 
their external audit and review. O’Dowd & Hayes carried out a study into the whistle-blowing 
policies of 122 NHS Foundation Trusts.  Their results show that 118 out of 122 Foundation Trusts had 
differing approaches to whistle-blowing. 22 out of 118 Foundation Trusts do not specify what 
constitutes a ‘concern’ for employees. 23 trusts said that they will not protect an employee’s 
confidentiality if latter raises a concern and 106 trusts have included a provision on sanctions if the 
employees raised a false or malicious concern.(O'Dowd and Hayes, 2010) Barnsley Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust says staff can report concerns externally, but there is potential disciplinary action if 
they go outside unjustifiably. Their policy document mentions the word ‘disciplinary’ 21 
times.(Lakhani, 2012) This is very worrying since whistle-blowers should be protected and not 
punished. Whistle-blowers should not been perceived as bad, troublesome or difficult. 
Unfortunately, a recent NHS employee, Kay Sheldon was removed as a non-executive director of the 
Care Quality Commission, the NHS regulator. At a public inquiry into the failings of the Care Quality 
Commission, she expressed concerns about poor governance, leadership and accountability. 
Moreover, the inspections system was unsafe. Kay suffered from depression for 26 years. The Chair 
of the Care Quality Commission sought a report from an occupational health doctor, who was not a 
psychiatrist. He declared that Kay Sheldon was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.(Lakhani, 
2012) Kay expressed that: ‘They [the Care Quality Commission] were trying to discredit me as either 
mad or bad, as mentally ill or troublemaker-it’s shocking the lengths they were willing to go to in 
order to get me out.’(Lakhani, 2012) Kay Sheldon was eventually allowed to remain on the board 
after negotiation with the Department of Health and her lawyer. 
To the NHS, patient safety is of paramount importance. Whistle-blowers face a dilemma when they 
wish to blow the whistle about patient safety but they also have a duty to uphold patient 
confidentiality.  Just as solicitors act in the best interests of clients except where the instructions are 
illegal, doctors and NHS workers should act in the best interests of patients. The case of Gary Walker 
shows that even when a NHS employee raises a concern about patient safety, he was dismissed and 
was imposed a gagging clause. In Gary Walker’s case, the gagging clause was 15 pages long.(Lakhani, 
2012) Although it is void to use gagging clauses for exposing issues of public interest, Gary Walker’s 
case was settled by a compromise agreement. A year later, the Care Quality Commission made a full 
investigation into the trust which Gary Walker worked for. The Care Quality Commission found that 
Gary’s concerns were justified and demanded the trust to make urgent improvements, otherwise 
the trust will be closed down. Paul Moore, the ex-Head of Group Regulatory Risk at HBOS warned his 
manager before the financial crisis the HBOS were taking too many risks and that risk management 
was poor. He was subject to a gagging order by HBOS but he believed that public interest prevailed, 
so he breached the gagging order when he gave evidence to the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee under the protection of parliamentary privilege. Paul’s evidence has been useful to the 
public because up till his appearance before the House of Commons Treasury Committee, little was 
known about the bank’s practice. In financial institutions, Chief Risk Officers only have one interest—
that of the bank. They do not have direct contact with clients. Most employees in investment banks 
do not have direct contact with clients. The shift from ‘relationship banking’ to ‘sales banking’ over 
the past 20 years has diluted the client’s interest further. To protect employees in the financial 
industry, it is very important that banks have well-drafted whistle-blowing policies. They should 
reassure whistle-blowers that their concerns are taken seriously, that they are treated in confidence 
and that they will not suffer detriment, harassed, victimised or dismissed because of their acts. 
Strengthening protection of whistle-blowers through legislation is not ideal because it will only 
widen inequality further. The less advantaged will not be as well protected as the well-informed, 
more affluent claimants.(Feintuck and Keenan, 1998) Further, it is difficult to legislate what types of 
disclosure is protected since professional discretion must be taken into account.  
One suggestion to improve protection for whistle-blowers via corporate governance methods is to 
improve the internal complaints procedure so that managers can deal with the concern at the first 
instance.(McHale, 1995) McHale however, acknowledged that in practice, reliance on internal 
procedures is insufficient. When one person in senior management undermines the whistle-blower, 
then procedure falls apart. Introducing financial incentives under the federal False Claims Act to 
whistle-blowers has not increased the number of claims in the US. As seen above in section 2, most 
whistle-blowers in both the US and UK are not driven by financial awards. In most cases, whistle-
blowers blew the whistle on grounds of altruism rather than financial gain. In the US, whistle-
blowers in Oregon can obtain up to $250 if this is an amount greater than the potential damages in a 
retaliation claim for whistle-blowing. (McHale, 1995) Research has revealed that there is little 
evidence of abuse since whistle-blowers are not protected without assistance. Further, those who 
make disclosures are more likely to be young people and those with low self-esteem.(McHale, 1995)    
Section 6: An alternative model: Whistle-blowers as gatekeepers? 
In the US, some nurses act as patient advocates to highlight the breach of patients’ rights. Free 
speech is safeguarded as a right in the US Constitution. In New Jersey for example, patients are 
informed of their rights by receiving a Charter of Rights as a matter of law. There is also a designated 
member of staff to deal with grievances.(McHale, 1995) There are two difficulties with the use of 
patient advocates. First, patient advocates are employees themselves so their independence can be 
questioned. Secondly, one cannot expect too much from patient advocates. Their roles are limited to 
considering grievances only. There is a gradual move in the UK towards establishing patient 
advocates in the NHS. The success of such patient advocates will depend on the acceptance by 
stakeholders in the health industry. They will however, act as a useful link between patients and 
health care provider. 
In the financial industry, a bank manager and a customer will have a clear client relationship. 
However, modern banking has shifted to selling products rather than acting in the client’s best 
interest. The CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, Antonia Horta-Osorio, said that banks have been 
"complacent, non-customer-focused and inefficient" in recent years.(Knight, 2012) Further, there is 
no standardised Code of Conduct for bankers. Each bank has its own Code of Conduct. The first step 
to protect whistle-blowers should be incorporation of the proposed FCA’s standardised Code of 
Conduct and whistle-blowing policies into employees’ contracts. Secondly, the concept of patient 
advocates is unlikely to work in the financial industry due to the focus on products in modern 
banking. Therefore, the author wishes to propose the alternative model of whistle-blowers acting as 
gatekeepers. 
The ‘gatekeeper’ theory was first advocated by Professor Kraakman in 1986. (Kraakman, 1986) In 
Professor Kraakman’s view, third parties such as accountants, auditors and lawyers can play a useful 
monitoring and enforcement role in corporate governance. They can ‘disrupt misconduct’ of 
employers by withholding their cooperation. Professor Kraakman further suggested in his footnotes 
that there can be a duty of whistle-blowing on the gatekeeper’s part on the wrongdoer. (Kraakman, 
1986) The financial crisis of 2007-2009 provides an example of how accountants and lawyers failed 
in their roles as gatekeepers. Lehman Brothers International Europe utilised an accounting device 
called Repo 105 which masked the size of Lehman Brothers’ balance sheet. There was pressure for 
investment banks such as Lehman Brothers to reduce their leverage at the end of 2007. Even if Repo 
105 was not lethal, it was certainly poisonous. Lehman Brothers had been abusing it as far back as 
2001, using repurchase agreements to finance assets but, unlike with typical repo transactions, 
treating them for accounting purposes as sold. This enabled Lehman Brothers to cover up its true 
leverage, making it seem lower than it actually was. Lehman Brothers International Europe took the 
lead role in Repo 105 transactions. This is because Lehman Brothers (the parent company) had 
difficulty complying with SFAS 140, the US accounting rules. They could not obtain true sale 
transactions, which meant that assets could not go off-balance. The leverage ratio was thus not 
reduced. In the UK, Linklaters, a London based law firm was able to obtain true sale status for 
Lehman Brothers International Europe. Anton Valukas states in his report: "Although the Linklaters’s 
letter was written for the exclusive benefit of Lehman Brothers International Europe, a significant 
volume of Lehman's Repo 105 transactions was executed for the benefit and using the securities of 
one or more US-based Lehman entities” (Valukas, 2010). It is important to note that there is no 
evidence that Linklaters acted illegally. Regulatory arbitrage succeeded here due to differences in 
international financial regulations and standards. This lacuna in accounting and financial regulation 
must be addressed immediately. Accountants and lawyers must co-operate to stop regulatory 
arbitrage. 
Professor Coffee adopted a narrower definition of ‘gatekeeper’ to mean a ‘reputational intermediary 
who provides verification or certification services to investors.’ (Coffee, 2004a) Auditors and credit 
rating agencies are examples of gatekeepers. Through behavioural economics, Professor Coffee 
proved that reputation alone could not guarantee gatekeepers from fulfilling their duties. (Coffee, 
2004a) In Professor Coffee’s opinion, ‘to some degree, gatekeepers will be followed even when they 
are not trusted, because it is expected that they will influence the market’. (Coffee, 2004a) Since 
reputation alone would not prevent corporate scandals, scholars have shifted their attention to 
other incentives. Professor Coffee recommended a form of strict liability for gatekeepers, although 
lawyers are excluded. This is because ‘auditors are better at discovering fraud than attorneys’. 
(Coffee, 2004b) Strict liability is too harsh and the fault-based system was ineffective. Professor 
Coffee therefore recommends that gatekeepers should act like insurers and their liability is capped 
based on a multiple of the gatekeeper’s revenues. Professor Partnoy (Partnoy, 2004) agrees that 
insuring is sensible but differs in that he caps the gatekeeper’s liability through a contract between 
the corporation and the gatekeepers. The most notable difference between Professors Coffee and 
Partnoy is that under Professor Coffee’s theory, a gatekeeper can be held liable even though the 
corporation is not (Coffee, 2004b). 
Professor Coffee’s explanation on the exclusion of lawyer is interesting. In the UK, lawyers are often 
protected by legal professional privilege. Legal professional privilege protects communications 
between clients and lawyers. It belongs to the client and aims to protect the client. The duty owed to 
clients sits above the lawyer’s duty to disclose unless the lawyer is used, knowingly or unknowingly, 
to commit or cover up a crime or serious fraud, then he can disclose what he knows. Whilst 
individuals who make ‘qualified disclosures’ under PIDA are protected from victimisation, lawyers 
are not due to the legal professional privilege. Therefore, if a lawyer suspects his client is involved in 
fraud or money laundering activities, he is not protected under PIDA. He is however, protected 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and terrorism legislation since he has a statutory duty to 
report such activities. Therefore, only in limited circumstances would a UK lawyer make disclosures. 
Strict liability on lawyers applies only in exceptional cases. In-house lawyers give legal advice to their 
client organisation and they are also part of the internal investigation if an employee raises a 
concern. They only act for one client, unlike lawyers in private practice. It is therefore 
understandable that there is little incentive to blow the whistle in such an environment. The case of 
Akzo Nobel Chemicals Limited and Akcros Chemicals Limited v Commission of the European 
Communities (C-550/07) stated that in-house counsels are not protected by legal professional 
privilege. This is because they are not ’independent lawyers’ since they have employment contracts 
with their clients. In-house counsels are thus protected by PIDA if they make disclosures. Whether 
they will is doubtful since their loyalty lies with one client only.  
In the US, legal professional privilege is more limited than in the UK. The ‘crime-fraud’ exception to 
legal professional privilege means that attorneys are not protected if they wish to disclose a crime or 
fraud. They are not under a duty to do so. Further, whistle-blowing protection differs from state to 
state. In Minnesota, there is a ‘job duties exception’ for whistle-blowers. In the case of Brian Kidwell, 
an in-house counsel for Sybaritic Incorporation, was held to be merely performing his duties when 
he sent an email to an external source regarding the company’s alleged concealment of documents. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Kidwell was not whistle-blowing and that his dismissal is 
justified because he breached his fiduciary duties by sending the email to an external source. The 
Court did allow exceptions to this so that an employee would be protected if he makes the report 
outside his usual channels or if the report went beyond the remit of his job description. This is 
unsatisfactory for attorneys since they receive little protection and have little incentive for blowing 
the whistle. Other professionals will be even more vulnerable without legal professional privilege or 
protection under the relevant whistle-blowing legislation. A range of protective mechanisms are 
required to protect whistle-blowers.  
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act encourages whistle-
blowers to provide information since they are financially rewarded. Further, whistle-blowers are 
protected from retaliation by employers. As seen earlier, not all whistle-blowers are motivated by 
money. Moreover, Fisher et al (Fisher et al., 2000) casted doubt over the relationship between the 
use of financial incentives and the quality of information received. This is particularly so because 
whistle-blowing is an ‘intrinsically personal activity’ and altruistic.(Fisher et al., 2000) Protection 
from retaliation by employers is better since many whistle-blowers are protected from 
discrimination. The author however, believes that this does not safeguard the whistle-blower’s job. 
Dismissal is the ultimate sanction for whistle-blowers even though it is automatically unfair under UK 
law. Other channels must be used to protect whistle-blowers. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (‘the 
2002 Act’) gives protection to US whistle-blowers through corporate governance recommendation; 
civil and criminal channels. First, the 2002 Act requires all public companies to establish independent 
audit committees. Internal complaints procedures should deal with employees’ complaints in a 
confidential manner.  Secondly, new ethical standards are set up for attorneys so that they know 
when they are required to blow the whistle on their clients. Thirdly, an honest whistle-blower who 
reports to a law enforcement officer will be protected from retaliation under the 2002 Act. Finally, 
by virtue of clause 3b of the 2002 Act, the Securities Exchange Commission can enforce every clause 
of the 2002 Act and impose criminal sanctions for breaching it.(Kohn, 2012) In the UK, the Corporate 
Governance Code 2010 requires at least three independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee of FTSE 350 companies. The Walker Review has proposed more independence within the 
risk committee, which will be discussed below. Auditors are better equipped to detect fraud or 
financial malpractice, especially in the financial industry. Building on Kraakman and Coffee’s theories 
on gatekeeping, the author suggests that the regulator, Chief Risk Officers and the auditors should 
work together as gatekeepers. This would give better protection for employees in the financial 
industry. Public Concern at Work, a UK charity which helps whistle-blowers, said that: ‘Regulators 
should promote the role of and protection for employees blowing the whistle internally, to them as 
regulators and beyond as a means to encourage and help responsible employers to (a) establish 
effective internal compliance systems and (b) adopt open and constructive relationships with them 
as regulators.’ The financial regulator should have an open, honest and transparent relationship with 
the Chief Risk Officer so that they discuss any potential matter in confidence before the Chief Risk 
Officer mentions it internally. This should be set out as best practice in a code of practice for the 
regulator. The Chief Risk Officer and the regulator should act as joint gatekeepers.  
For this to work well, the regulator should eliminate the notion of regulatory capture. Regulatory 
capture, also known as the ‘grabbing hand’ by Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), is 
used by the regulator or regulatees to promote their private interests, rather than the public 
interest. (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001) Politics and banking are inextricably linked. Barth et al (Barth 
et al., 2006) enunciated succinctly that ‘banking supervisory and regulatory policies are selected by 
those in power for the benefit of a narrow set of society, subject to the constraints of prevailing 
political institutions’. Whilst it is inevitable that politicians will play a role in shaping banking 
regulatory policies, it is far from desirable that the government, via the regulator, pursues its own 
interests rather than the public interest. In light of the vast amounts of taxpayers’ money required in 
rescuing certain banks, public interest must prevail after the financial crisis of 2007.  
With the public interest in mind, the author builds on the idea of Tricker (Tricker, 2011). Tricker’s 
main argument is that external auditors should report to the regulator, not shareholders. Following 
the financial crisis, there has been a paradigm shift to stakeholder sustainability. Tricker explained 
that: ‘if a company wants limited liability it must meet societies' expectations and play by their rules. 
Limited liability is a privilege not a right: what society gives it can take away. Power in society should 
be exercised through its legislators not by companies through their directors.’ (Tricker, 2011) 
Auditors will be appointed by regulator and they will report to regulator. The state should protect 
the various stakeholders’ interests. The regulator will work closely with shareholders, where they 
will hire, fire or reappoint the auditors at the general meeting. (Tricker, 2011) The author would 
modify Tricker’s suggestion so that institutional investors should work closely with the regulator 
since institutional investors have more time and resources than the individual shareholder to 
participate in such activities. 
If the matter cannot be resolved with the regulator or it requires the management’s attention, the 
Chief Risk Officer has a power of veto on the board of directors. This proposal goes further than the 
Walker Review. According to the Walker Review, (Walker, 2009) the Chief Risk Officer is accountable 
to the Board Risk Committee, a committee to be made up primarily of non-executive directors. The 
Chief Risk Officer should be independent from the business units and enable objectivity to be 
preserved. He reports to the Chief Executive Officer and/or the Chief Financial Officer. The Basle 
Committee's consultation paper on corporate governance stipulates that senior executives such as 
the Chief Operations Office or Chief Financial Officer, should not also act as Chief Risk Officer or 
equivalent. (Basle Committee for Banking Supervision, 2009) The Chief Risk Officer needs to attend 
board meetings regularly to ensure that the board of directors are aware of the risk profile. It is here 
that the Chief Risk Officer should have a power of veto if he disagrees with the rest of the board. 
With the power of veto, the Chief Risk Officer can challenge the board’s strategy with some 
ammunition.  Empowerment of the Chief Risk Officer by the board is essential to secure a sound 
relationship. The Walker Review (Walker, 2009) and the Basle Committee paper on corporate 
governance (Basle, 2009) both recommend that the Chief Risk Officer should not be removed 
without approval of the board. The author’s alternative model of corporate governance shown in 
diagram 1 is radical but it is only with the above changes in corporate governance that better 
protection can be given to whistle-blowers. The advantage of this model is that it would eliminate 
the ‘performance/conformance’ and ‘independence’ paradoxes’. (Tricker, 2011)  The main criticism 
of unitary boards is that strategy and performance are integrated, where directors are responsible 
for both setting out the aims and ensuring that they are achieved. The solution to this is encouraging 
non-executive directors to sit on the board of directors. Non-executive director are perceived as 
independent, objective and impartial. The paradox is that the more independent a director is, the 
less he knows about the company (Tricker, 2011). Having the Chief Risk Officer on the board of 
directors would bring expertise to the board. He should not be a non-executive director since he is 
an employee of the company thus compromising his independence. His presence and the power of 
veto should encourage him to report his concerns. More transparency in banks should thus follow. 
Diagram 1: Alternative model of corporate governance 
 
Section 7: Conclusion 
Whistle-blowing is a personal and altruistic option chosen by a few workers. They do not want their 
concerns to be ignored, ostracised or lose their jobs. Whistle-blowing is not an enforcement tool for 
regulation but it can be a useful deterrent. Current UK law is inadequate in protecting whistle-
blowers, especially case law. Whistle-blowers who blow the whistle are seen to be breaching the 
common law duty of implied faith and duty. They are labelled as trouble-makers. The case of 
Heinisch v Germany offers some glimmer of hope since the European Court of Human Rights have 
found that where a whistle-blower is dismissed, this could amount to a breach of the right to 
freedom of expression under Art 10 ECHR unless it was “prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim 
and is necessary in a democratic society for achievement of such an aim”. Although this decision is 
encouraging, the whistle-blower is not protected from dismissal. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998 aims to offer more protection to employees in relation to external disclosures, especially those 
of a public interest. The author then reviewed how both case law and the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 1998 failed to protect Paul Moore, ex-Head of Group Regulatory Risk at HBOS. Having reviewed 
the whistle-blowing policies in give UK banks and compared the position with the health industry, 
the author proposes the following steps to improve protection for whistle-blowers in the financial 
industry. First, financial organisations need to incorporate standardised whistle-blowing policies into 
their workplace and into employee’s contracts. This would ensure that employee’s legitimate 
concerns are taken seriously and give employees protection from wrongful dismissal if the policy is 
not followed. Secondly, the Financial Conduct Authority should work with an independent 
professional regulatory body for bankers and develop a standardised Code of Conduct for bankers. 
They should also be prepared to take enforcement action against rogue bankers. Thirdly, to ensure 
that there is Chief Risk Officers should be able to raise concerns with the regulator freely and openly. 

















sit on the board of directors and act as the chairman of Board Risk Committee. Institutional investors 
should work with the regulator to ensure that wider stakeholders’ interests are taken into account 
and actioned.  
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